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  JAPANESE CITIES IN CHINESE PERSPECTIVE: TOWARDS A CONTEXTUAL, 
REGIONAL APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE URBANISM 
 
 
Abstract: The paper uses an introduction to the comparative study of Japanese and 
Chinese cities to make a case for a regional approach to thinking about cities in East Asia. 
In so doing it argues for contextually sensitive comparative urbanism as a platform for a 
broader understanding of trends towards global convergence. It outlines three different 
types of comparative urbanism and sets out a basic framework for the study of urban 
change in the larger cities of China and Japan. Its central argument is that the close 
relationship between the state and capital in the two countries has conditioned the rapid 
and dynamic nature of urban change. [Key words: comparative urbanism; Japanese cities; 
Chinese cities; developmental state; region.] 
 
 
 
JAPANESE CITIES, CHINESE CITIES AND THE EAST ASIAN REGION 
 
This paper is a call for a regional approach to urban studies, one that is theoretically 
grounded and contextually rich.
1
 My starting point lies in what I perceive as a failure to 
integrate the study of urban change in Japan into a regional and an international comparative 
context. The questions I raise here connect Japanese to Chinese cities and anchor them in the 
East Asian region. They relate not only to Japanese and Chinese cities and their regional 
context but also to wider questions of convergence and difference—the extent to which 
claims can be made for an urban convergence orchestrated by global capital. My principal 
argument is that a comparative study of urban change in Japan and China is mutually 
beneficial, and enhances the study of urban spaces in the East Asian region and beyond.  
China, with its Communist polity and its market economy, has its cities more often bundled 
into a conceptual basket alongside those of post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, but 
nearly always with a caveat: generalizations that might make sense in the European context 
apply with difficulty to China (Wu et al., 2010). If it can be argued, however, that there is a 
common pattern to urban change in Central and Eastern Europe, why might the same not be 
possible for East Asia, that is to say China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, territories bound 
together not only by a shared culture (political culture, culture of writing, religious culture), 
but more importantly in this context by patterns of influence, empire, and investment? This 
regional context offers a sounder comparative focus for the understanding of urban change in 
China and lifts the study of Japanese cities out of the trap of uniqueness into which it 
sometimes falls. At the same time, it offers the chance to draw on lessons from work on CEE 
cities in establishing the salience of path-dependent approaches within a broader neoliberal 
urban canvas (Stanilov, 2007). What follows is very much an invitation to further study and 
one that focuses on the two leading countries in the region, while conscious of the need to 
consider Korea and Taiwan and their cities in the same regional picture. As I hope to show, 
there is much to be gained from a specific comparative focus on Japanese and Chinese 
urbanism. 
These are issues with a strong resonance in recent literature that links debates in urban 
studies and develops the idea of ordinary cities (Robinson, 2002) to encompass postcolonial 
concepts of cosmopolitan urbanism (Legg and McFarlane, 2008). The literature is animated 
by a sense that urban studies is innately comparative and that this needs to be recognized, but 
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that comparative urbanism needs to be informed by a cosmopolitan sensitivity, sensitive to 
context and built on an understanding of relevant historical threads. A strong case has been 
made for this approach to comparative urbanism in a European context (Bodnár, 2001; Le 
Galès, 2002). But any such comparative work needs to be both highly sensitive to difference 
and bold enough to contemplate generalization (Ma, 2002).  
One of the aims of this paper is to suggest ways in which comparative study of Chinese 
and Japanese cities within an East Asian regional context can help resolve the tension 
between sensitivity to difference and the need to generalize in order to transcend specificities 
and tell stories that have wider meaning. This is predicated on a rich understanding of the 
regional context, and indeed it is the regional focus that opens up possibilities for a more 
sensitive understanding of convergence and difference. In other words, I am advocating here a 
reassessment of the conceptual mileage that can be gained from area studies, in line with 
arguments recently advanced by Pollard et al. (2009). An area—or regional—focus (I am 
treating the terms as interchangeable) recognizes the historical weight that proximity has 
brought to bear in terms of human ties over a long period of time (Legg and McFarlane, 
2008). It also facilitates a reading of links to global flows and trends that is more sensitive to 
local difference, and provides theoretical sustenance for a contextually sensitive 
understanding of region and difference within regions. 
In this paper, I argue that a number of different types of comparative urbanism can be 
identified, each of which can be effective, but that it is work growing out of an understanding 
of regional context which has most to offer. I argue that comparative urbanism is sometimes 
systemic and convergent, making a case for global convergence brought on by networks for 
the support and transfer of capital. Or it is strategic, comparing cities or aspects of social life 
in different settings in order to make specific points, about governance, perhaps, or social 
segregation. Or it grows out of a reading of regional context and is designed to draw out 
difference as well as commonality within the regional context. It is precisely this sort of 
comparative urbanism that is being advocated here, not least because it affords the most 
robust basis for an understanding of the path-dependent nature of neoliberal urbanization (He 
and Wu, 2009). I go on to suggest that developmental state theory brings an invaluable 
regional perspective, out of which a contextually sensitive comparative urbanism can grow. I 
then sketch out a temporal framework for comparative research. From there, I examine the 
possibilities for work comparing cities in contemporary Japan and China in terms of the 
changing urban landscape and impacts on urban life-spaces. Finally, the argument is brought 
into the broader context of the East Asian region.  
 
CONVERGENT, STRATEGIC, AND CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON 
 
My personal interest in a comparative approach to urban change in East Asia was 
sparked by Terry McGee‘s use of the term desakota (village-town in Malay/Indonesian) to 
signify areas of mixed urban and rural activities around and between large East and Southeast 
Asian cities and the debate this engendered (McGee, 1991). His intentionally extra-Western 
conceptualization was criticized by Dick and Rimmer (1998) for its disregard for the global 
flows of urban development capital and for its privileging of an Orientalist vision of area 
studies. Amongst many subsequent contributions to the debate, Ma and Wu (2005) have been 
critical of what they see as Dick and Rimmer‘s implicit alignment of globalization with 
homogenization. McGee‘s conceptualization of desakota does indeed raise issues, in terms of 
breadth of application and distinctiveness, for example, but the attempt to establish an idiom 
for regional urbanism was surely a laudable one. For, as I argue here, it is on the basis of an 
understanding of regional patterns that arguments about the role of global capital and the 
nature of neoliberal urbanization can best be advanced. 
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 Comparative urbanism raises problems of scale, and indeed of time/ scale but both 
elements are essential structural ingredients in comparative study. These have been raised, 
discussed, dropped, and then raised and discussed all over again. Much of the discussion has 
been engendered by the work of Janet Abu-Lughod, and in particular her reflections on North 
African cities (1976) and her more recent, seminal volume on New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles: America’s Global Cities. Central to Abu-Lughod‘s comparative approach is a 
structured concern for time and scale and an emphasis on the importance of historical detail. It 
is an emphasis that is not static, but one that seeks out ―common mechanisms of process‖, 
looking for generalizations ―on the level of ‗becoming‘ rather than on the level of ‗being‘‖ 
(1976, 22) and counteracting appeals to unique status or sense of unidirectional trajectory.   
Comparative urbanism lends itself to calls for a structured approach and ease of 
classification. Charles Tilly proposed four types of comparison: individualizing, 
encompassing, universalizing, and variation-finding (1984, 81). These are interpreted in terms 
of recent works in the field of urban studies by Neil Brenner (2001) in his review of Abu-
Lughod‘s 1999 volume. The typology that I advance here is broadly similar to Tilly‘s but with 
an underpinning that relates more directly to the urban comparative framework: my strategic 
comparison corresponds to Tilly‘s individualizing; the point is to compare cities and social 
trends in cities in order to make specific points about both. Systemic–convergent comparison 
dovetails with Tilly‘s universalizing category, the aim being to forefront the role of global 
capital in shrinking space. But for these two comparative modes to be successful they are 
reliant on the insights derived from an understanding of regional context. This is where the 
third category comes into play. Contextually sensitive–regional comparison subsumes Tilly‘s 
encompassing and variation-finding categories; it enables regional space to help build a 
clearer picture both of points of variation and areas of commonality (admittedly not quite the 
same as Tilly‘s ―plac[ing] different instances at various locations within the same system‖ 
[1984, 83] to form an ―encompassing‖ purpose of comparison).  
To state this is neither to deny that convergent comparative work is of value nor to 
suggest that only regional and contextual comparison should be undertaken. Indeed, some of 
the most rewarding comparative work involving Japanese cities has been strategic in its 
scope, contrasting developments in Japan and in the West to advance a specific argument 
(Forrest and Hirayama, 2009; Fielding, 2004; Jacobs, 2003). The same is true of some recent 
work on Chinese cities (Logan, 2008; Chen, 2009; Wu and Webster, 2010). There is surely 
much to be gained from this sort of strategic comparison. Issues of expertise, which all too 
easily become a real barrier to contextually rich urban comparison (Ma, 2002; Pollard et al., 
2009), can be overcome through the combined use of expert knowledge in the two different 
geographical areas or through recourse to local ―home-based‖ accretions of understanding.  
Systemic-convergent urban comparative work has focused on Tokyo. Japan‘s capital 
city has been inserted prominently into discussion about global convergence, most notably by 
Friedmann (1986), Sassen (1991), and Taylor (2000) in their work on world and global cities. 
And yet the Japanese capital sits uneasily in the set of hypotheses elaborated by these writers. 
It is particularly relevant to the argument being advanced here that, in their critique of 
Friedmann‘s and Sassen‘s conceptual positions, Hill and Kim emphasized the nature of the 
developmental state as a key determinant of urban change in Tokyo, and with it Seoul. Tokyo, 
they argued, is not like New York ―market-centred and bourgeois [but] state-centred and 
political-bureaucratic‖ (2000, 2168). The bureaucracy occupies centre stage; risk-takers on 
the markets are secondary players. Manufacturing is a key motor driving the economy of 
these cities, as much as finance and other high order service industries. In social terms, both 
Tokyo and Seoul, as well as Shanghai, have a much less heterogeneously composed 
population than either New York or London. The regional arena, they are saying, is much 
more fruitful for comparative urbanism than is the global, systemic one. 
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 Hill and Kim‘s approach, clearly, is sensitive to regional context. For them, the 
―developmental‖ nature of the Japanese state, is central to an understanding of why Tokyo 
and Seoul sit with difficulty alongside New York and London. It is in the context of 
developmental state theory that the comparative study of Japanese cities should be placed. 
Developmental state theory is comparative by its very nature, and regional in its compass, and 
the region it encompasses is generally seen to consist of the territories that concern us here, 
Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, with the addition of Singapore. China today meets many of the 
relevant criteria of a developmental state (Stubbs, 2009). The set of assumptions behind 
developmental state theory are well-known and do not need a full recapitulation here (Wade, 
1990; Woo-Cummings, 1999). They are built around a set of institutions and policy 
approaches that create a close and productive relationship between the state and capital. But 
what has been little studied and discussed in this literature is the way in which the role of the 
state and capital and their close relationship has conditioned the nature, speed and shape of 
urban change. This is the crucial issue: exploring the path-dependent relationship between 
global neoliberal urban change and the Chinese and Japanese developmental states, and it is 
to this theme that the paper now turns.  
 
A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SINO-JAPANESE COMPARATIVE 
URBANISM 
 
Any engagement with the comparative study of Japanese and Chinese cities needs to be 
grounded in a historical framework set alongside a sense of geographical juxtaposition. The 
strength of a comparative engagement with the study of urban change in Japan and China 
hinges on this shared historical framework, facilitating a study of the commonalities and 
differences in patterns of urban change. The periods are as follows: the first covers the 
decades of introduction and implementation of modern (largely Western) techniques of city 
building and urban planning. The second is the high-water mark of state-organized, 
production-oriented re-modeling of the urban terrain. The third is the contemporary period of 
increasingly permissive capital-driven urban restructuring. Such a periodization inevitably 
comes with numerous caveats, even if several of these serve to reinforce the usefulness of the 
approach.   
Any commentary on the first period, however brief, should start with an 
acknowledgement of the influence of Japan on Chinese urban modernization both as ‗benign‘ 
educator of intellectuals and incubator of concepts and as ‗malign‘ imperial force. This 
indicates a slightly later timing in the process of urban modernization in China than in Japan; 
and it suggests a different experience of Western imperialism. Treaty ports, for example, 
formed a far more significant and longstanding presence in Chinese history. At the same time, 
the reaction to imperialist pressures shared common features: In both countries, attempts were 
made to restructure the capital cities—Beijing and Tokyo—in order to impress foreign powers 
(Esherick, 2000; Waley, 2005) in a sort of process of auto-colonization. Many young Chinese 
scientists, doctors, reformers and intellectuals studied in Japan at this time (Rogaski, 2000). 
They returned with ideas about how to implement the infrastructure of modern urbanism, as 
for example with the concept of the public park (Shi, 1998). Dominating this period, however, 
and shaping modern East Asian urbanism is Japanese imperial conquest, first in Korea and 
Taiwan, where Japan was builder, industrializer, exploiter, and planner, and then in China, 
starting with the colonization of Manchuria and the construction of a new capital at Shenyang. 
The second of the three periods outlined above might be identified as high modernist, 
marked in particular by a powerful (not to say authoritarian) state and a hegemonic ideology 
(whether overt or covert), thus fulfilling the key requirements as set out in James Scott‘s 
analysis of ―high modernism‖ as a state-run political and ideological construct (Scott, 1998). 
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Because of China‘s relative isolation during much of this period, and because of the different 
political and social systems in place at the time, little attention has been paid to commonalities 
in urban development during this second period. Both China and Japan were increasingly 
wrapped up in an approach to development that favored the logic of production and a massive 
emphasis on funding the construction of an infrastructure to support industrial production. In 
Communist China this was known as ―production first, life second‖ (xian shengchan, hou 
shenghuo). The work unit (danwei) was both organizing principal for industrial production 
and also the physical compound within which production and daily life occurred. In the cities 
of developmental Japan, the state-directed channeling of energies to work and the provision of 
a welfare system that reinforced this conspired to create cities in which the interests of 
industrial production prevailed, even though the sites of production themselves and the 
housing provided for employees (known as shataku) was generally in corporate hands. 
Indeed, so single-minded was this emphasis on production that a number of severe and 
dramatic cases of industrial pollution ensued, and became a disturbing icon of the period.  
Clearly, the period of ―production first, life second‖ encompasses many differences in 
the political and social dynamics of the two countries. To take but one of the most obvious 
examples, in China movement into cities was all but completely blocked for much of this 
period, while in Japan there were massive influxes into the main urban areas. This should not, 
however, obscure commonalities in the social forces at play. These were, for example, years 
during which neighborhood organizations reached a peak of influence as agents of social 
control and/or harmony (depending on how one looks at it). Both the residents committees 
(jumin weiyuanhui) of Chinese cities and the neighborhood associations (chōnaikai and 
jichikai) in urban areas in Japan bridged the gap between the household and the lowest tier of 
local government. The political and social role they played in Chinese cities was clear, but 
one should not underestimate their importance in Japan as agents of social stability. To some 
extent they retain this strength today in both countries (Pekkanen, 2006; Read and Chen, 
2008).  
The third period takes us from the early 1980s and covers the decades up to the present. 
In both countries, during the contemporary period, the state has allied itself with capital to 
engineer a restructuring of large cities. It has engineered changes—in property ownership 
rights in the case of China and zoning regulations in the case of Japan—to create propitious 
conditions for the exploitation of the urban terrain. In both countries, urban development 
capital has created highly dynamic, plastic urban environments. And in both countries, loose 
planning regulations have greatly facilitated the restructuring of urban space, with master 
planning being little more than indicative (Yeh, 2005). Nevertheless, there have been, and 
remain, some significant, if better understood, differences, relating, for example, to the more 
transnational nature of Chinese urban capital and to the more overt role played by the Chinese 
state. Common patterns of neoliberal urban restructuring are, therefore, apparent in both 
countries, but their nature and consequences differ, as we will see in the section that follows.  
 
PUTTING SINO-JAPANESE COMPARATIVE URBANISM TO WORK 
 
The common story of restructuring of the urban landscape over the last 30 years or so 
provides a central spine, as it were, to which comparative work can be attached. With this 
shared central spine in place, it becomes possible to develop a contextually rich comparative 
perspective. The paragraphs that follow elaborate on the comparative approach. They start by 
identifying regulatory reforms that have accelerated urban change in both countries. This is 
followed by an overview of the interlocking roles of capital and state, and how these have 
shaped the urban landscape. The section concludes with an outline of some of the ways in 
which the changing urban landscape affects the life-spaces of those who live in large Chinese 
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and Japanese cities. The focus is on the largest cities  in Japan and China; while some of the 
points made here would apply at lower levels on the urban scale; others would need 
qualification.  
The urban landscapes of Chinese and Japanese cities have been shaped as a result of 
their penetration by extractive capital—by large corporations, investment companies, private 
developers, specialist property companies, all involved in extracting profit from the urban 
terrain. Urban landscapes have experienced their period of most radical change in both 
countries from about the same time, the early 1980s, although the process took off a few years 
later in China. In both countries, huge pressures have forced an outward spread and an even 
more remarkable upward thrust in the urban fabric. In both countries the surge in extractive 
urban development that occurred reflected decisions taken by central governments and 
enthusiastically endorsed by city governments to make land a basis for capital accumulation 
through the release of land onto the market and re-regulation to favor vertical construction in 
cities that had until recently been largely horizontal.  
Japan has experienced three turbulent decades during which property prices quadrupled, 
fell to their original level, and then tentatively rose again (Waley, 2007). During this period 
the urban landscape of its major cities has been altered beyond recognition through an 
explosion of high-rise buildings. Two intense spates of profit extraction from the urban terrain 
can be discerned. The first was in the 1980s, when the then prime minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro ordered a loosening of planning controls to stimulate urban growth. The second 
started in 2002, with the promulgation of statutory measures designed principally to spur 
high-rise office construction. The Japanese state, national and metropolitan (in Tokyo‘s case), 
has made a pitch for global status, albeit a somewhat uncoordinated one (Saitō and Thornley, 
2003; Tsukamoto, 2011). The state is therefore undoubtedly an important player, but while an 
instigator and champion of urban restructuring, it is not (or is no longer) the prime mover as 
the Chinese state can arguably be seen to be. Japan‘s urban development capital is stubbornly 
national, even if it has global outreach. Japan‘s largest cities can be seen as a terrain for 
competitive development involving the country‘s major conglomerates. Despite longstanding 
American political pressure, foreign developers (construction companies, etc.) have made few 
inroads into this important aspect of Japanese economic activity. In summary, it is important 
to underline the close bonds that exist between the state and urban development capital in 
Japan, even as one acknowledges the recent partial repositioning of the state. 
If Japan has experienced tumultuous urban change in the last few decades, this is all the 
more so in China. Here, the state, both national and local, has guided the marketization of 
land and the commodification of property, using a dual system to place land on the market, 
through leasing and allocation. The leasing of urban land has been of prime importance in 
generating the necessary capital to improve infrastructure and thus help generate more capital 
accumulation from land (Wu, 2009; Hsing, 2010). Municipal and district governments in a 
city like Shanghai have reached out to global companies, in effect offering them contracts to 
rebuild their cities. This is part of what Gaubatz has called the ―reconceptualization of large 
cities from local to global entities‖ (2005, 115). The (local) state has forged what have been 
referred to as ―Chinese-style ‗interest coalitions‘ [with] international capital‖ (Fu, 2002, p. 
118) to build the country‘s new CBDs, especially in China‘s coastal cities (Yin et al., 2005). 
Much of this capital, including investments from overseas Chinese and Taiwanese interests, 
has funded urban development projects. In recent years, the central state, having released 
energies at the local municipal level, has been attempting to re-assert control through 
measures designed to re-establish a greater degree of control over the urban restructuring 
process (Xu et al., 2009).  
The increasing number and territorial spread of skyscraper clusters with their associated 
high-order service functions and low-order service requirements has occasioned a massive 
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restructuring of Chinese city centers as well as a less spectacular but nevertheless significant 
upheaval amongst inner city communities in large Japanese cities. As the skyscrapers have 
shot upwards, the global office functions and elite production and consumption services that 
fill them have spread outwards. In Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing, as in Tokyo, distinct 
CBDs (or sub-centers, in the case of Tokyo) have appeared in different parts of the city 
which, with time, have put pressure on encircled low-lying residential districts.  
The expansion into these areas of global business and related functions alongside new 
and expensive high-rise housing has created social tensions in both Chinese and Japanese 
cities. In the former case, while city centers such as that of Shanghai have been largely 
cleared of their poorer residents, the otherwise rather brutal process has been mitigated by 
improved housing conditions in suburban and fringe parts of the city. In Japan, the tensions 
caused by city-center urban restructuring have been muted. The relaxation of a number of 
rules affecting the height of buildings passed unnoticed—unnoticed, that is, until the 
announcement of plans for the imminent construction of high-rise buildings in residential 
areas. Where these plans have been opposed by local residents, the courts have tended to 
accept relatively minor compromises from developers and allowed the construction to go 
ahead (Sorensen et al, 2010; Igarashi and Ogawa, 2006). 
On both sides of the East China Sea, distinctive forms of gentrification have emerged. 
In the centre of Tokyo, new apartments have been targeted by high-income small-household 
Japanese, keen to take advantage of ―competitive‖ property prices and the convenience of city 
centre life (Lützeler, 2008). In Shanghai, the new domestic affluent class has shown an 
aspiration for city centre living (Wang and Lau, 2009) -- and for gated complexes in the 
suburbs (Wu, 2010), a phenomenon yet to be seen at a significant scale in Japan. In both 
countries, as we have already seen, the state has played an important role, setting the ground 
rules and forming the appropriate alliances to aid this process. Sino-Japanese new-build 
gentrification thus shares a number of characteristics even as displacement has been more 
sharply etched into the Chinese urban scene than it has been in Japan. 
In Japan the rapid pace of change in the urban landscape has not resulted in social 
unrest. In China, where the extent of social dislocation has been significantly greater, the 
situation is less clear-cut, and there have been many outbursts of local protest, but the tightly 
policed nature of the urban terrain has prevented coordinated and widespread manifestations 
of anger. The absence of large geographical concentrations of poverty has arguably eased 
pressures and restricted the possibilities for a coordination of expressions of resentment, 
although recent research on both sides of the East China Sea suggests that the situation is 
deteriorating. In Japanese cities, pockets of poverty exist in districts where day laborers and 
the elderly homeless congregate, and poverty and isolation, especially among the elderly, can 
be found concentrated in post-war social housing estates (McCurry, 2007). At a more general 
level, disparities in wealth are demarcated on the urban terrain, but there is some 
disagreement about their extent and nature (Fujita and Hills, 1997; Fielding, 2004; Jacobs, 
2005). Where poverty exists in Japanese cities, it has until now tended to be spatially 
dispersed, hidden away at the household or individual level, or in distant, suburban housing 
estates. However, recent research supported by OECD figures indicates that it is on the 
increase (Nagata and Kiyokawa, 2009; Chiavacci, 2008) and suggests that the move away 
from lifelong employment structures to part-time, short-term jobs in the Japanese economy 
might soon start to be reflected in a measure of residential segregation in large Japanese cities 
(Slater 2010; Jacobs, forthcoming). 
In China‘s case, recent research has revised understandings of urban poverty in China 
and revealed a growing incidence of spatially differentiated hardship in large cities throughout 
the country, identifying three urban zones of poverty: ―inner-city dilapidated neighbourhoods, 
degraded workers‘ villages (danwei compounds developed by employers), and rural migrant 
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enclaves formed in the so-called ‗urban villages‘, i.e. areas of collectively owned village 
territory engulfed by an expanding city‖ (He et al., 2010, p. 329; Wu, et al., 2010). This 
growing polarization on the urban terrain is a consequence of institutional mechanisms such 
as the hukou system of residence permits, which denies rural residents access to welfare, 
housing and other services in an attempt to control migration to cities. It also represents the 
social fallout from the marketization of China‘s state-owned enterprises, as well as the results 
of housing commodification and a growing, affluent middle class.  
There are, then, some notable differences between the extent and spatiality of poverty in 
Chinese and Japanese cities. In both, however, there remain relatively low levels of social 
tension, and therefore, we may assume, higher levels of social integration. This is despite the 
growing incidence of poverty set against the extremely dynamic and plastic nature of the 
urban landscape, which is being transformed rapidly from a horizontal to a vertical 
environment as a result of the vigorous flow of capital operating on the urban terrain, 
incentivized by supportive state policies. Indeed, one might well argue that it is the strength of 
the developmental state, regardless of political coloration, that has exercised the required 
authority to suppress unrest, subtly perhaps in the Japanese case, but nonetheless powerfully. 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: WHAT EAST ASIAN URBANISM CAN TELL US 
ABOUT CONVERGENCE AND DIFFERENCE 
 
In both China and Japan, the state has initiated and directed policy changes that have 
promoted the commodification of urban space, as well as choreographing its globalization. 
Japanese capital has been well placed to take advantage of the new regulatory climate created 
by the state, while in China, overseas Chinese and other global interests have been drawn in.  
Long-term historical influences over city-building and the way cities are conceptualized 
spread eastwards from China encompassing Korea and Japan and adapting to local conditions 
as they spread. In the period of modernity waves of influence have swept back from Japan 
engulfing Korea, Taiwan, and China. By definition, a comparative urbanism of the East Asian 
region needs to include Korea and Taiwan. The general thrust of the arguments advanced here 
apply in some significant measure to the cities of Taiwan and Korea. For example, 
neighborhood organizations have played an important part in urban life in Korea and Taiwan, 
not least as a consequence of Japanese colonial policy (Read and Chen, 2008). And on a 
broader level, loose regulatory frameworks have been accompanied by a sense of symbiosis 
between capital and the state. The coherence of a regional approach is reinforced by the 
activities of Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, and  Korean capital as a driver of urban change in 
Southeast Asia. And yet, urban development capital and the social changes it engenders both 
in the ―classic‖ East Asian region and beyond it in Southeast Asia are factors largely absent 
from developmental state theorizing. This is despite the voluminous, wider literature on 
developmental state theory (summarized in Stubbs, 2008) and a growing sense of the 
importance of a regional conceptualization of welfare regimes in East Asia (Peng, et al., 
2010).  
As I suggested earlier in this paper, it is on the sound base that a contextually rich, 
regional comparative urbanism provides that generalizations can best be made—
generalizations, for example, about the differentiated impact of neoliberal urbanization, and 
about the networks and interactions that define it. The nature and extent of difference, and of 
convergence, at a global level is best appreciated on the strength of an understanding of 
difference and commonalities at a regional scale and the forging of regional networks. In this 
paper, I have proposed urban China and Japan as a starting point in thinking about the 
possible meanings of an East Asian regional urbanism. But even without considering the 
cases of Korea and Taiwan, it is clear that the nature of urban development capital varies, and 
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the links to global capital vary too. The conclusion that I wish to draw from this brief study of 
urban change in China and Japan is that the urban commodification and profit extraction that 
define neoliberal urbanization can usefully be understood at the regional level (Ching, 2000). 
And if we see the technologies of construction and the cultures of the transnational classes as 
ever stronger harbingers of convergence, then we must add that this convergence is deeply 
inflected by regional characteristics and colored by regional responses. 
Where should we look for these regional characteristics? We should look in the 
dynamic, indeed volatile, nature of Sino-Japanese urban change, driven by the close 
relationship between the state and capital (as proposed by developmental state theory) and 
manifested in particular through the rapid conversion of central and inner districts from a 
horizontal to a vertical landscape. We should look in the tendency for social tensions resulting 
from this rapidly changing urban landscape to be underplayed. But we should also look at 
growing residential segregation in China (and potentially in Japan) set against the continued 
existence of a number of local-based institutions of community governance. The regional 
scale is the most appropriate starting point for reflecting on the many possibilities for both 
convergence and difference.   
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abu-Lughod, J., 1976, The legitimacy of comparisons in comparative urban studies: A 
theoretical position and an application to North African cities. In J. Walton and L. 
Masotti, editors, The City in Comparative Perspective: Cross-National Research and 
New Directions in Theory. New York: Sage, 17–40. 
Abu-Lughod, J., 1999. New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: America’s Global Cities. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Bodnár, J., 2001, Fin de Millénaire Budapest: Metamorphoses of Urban Life. Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press.  
Brenner, N., 2001, World city theory, globalization and the comparative-historical method: 
Reflections on Janet Abu-Lughod‘s interpretation of contemporary urban 
restructuring. Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, 124–147. 
Chen, X., editor, 2009. Shanghai Rising: State Power and Local Transformations in a Global 
Megacity. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press. 
Chiavacci, D. 2008. From class struggle to general middle-class society to divided society: 
societal models of inequality in postwar Japan. Social Science Japan Journal, Vol.  
11, No. 1, 5–27.  
Ching, L., 2000, Globalizing the regional, regionalizing the global: mass culture and 
Asianism in the age of late capital. Public Culture, Vol. 12, No. 1, 233–257. 
Dick, H., and Rimmer, P., 1998, Beyond the Third World City: the new urban geography of 
South-east Asia. Urban Studies, Vol. 35, No. 12,  2303–2321. 
Esherick, J., editor, 2000, Remaking the Chinese city: Modernity and national identity, 1900–
1950. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. 
Fielding, A., 2004, Class and space: Social segregation in Japanese cities. Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers Vol. 29, No. 1, 64–84.  
Forrest, R., and Hirayama, Y., 2009, The uneven impact of neoliberalism on housing 
opportunities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research Vol. 33, No. 4, 
998–1013. 
Friedmann, J., 1986, The World City hypothesis. Development and Change Vol. 17, No. 1, 
60–83. 
sino-japanese, urban geography, waley.docx 
10 
 
Fu, Z., 2002, The state, capital, and urban restructuring in post-reform Shanghai. In J. Logan, 
editor, The New Chinese City: Globalization and Market Reform. Oxford: Blackwell, 
106–120.  
Fujita, K., and Hill, R. C., 1997, Together and Equal: Place Stratification in Osaka. In P. P. 
Karan and K. Stapleton, editors, The Japanese City. Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 105–128. 
Gaubatz, P., 2005, Globalization and the development of new central business districts in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. In L. Ma and F. Wu, editors, Restructuring the 
Chinese City: Changing Economy Society and Space. London: Routledge, 98–121.  
He S., and Wu, F., 2009, China's emerging neoliberal urbanism: perspectives from urban 
redevelopment. Antipode, Vo. 41, No. 2, 282–304. 
He, S., Wu, F., Webster, C., and Liu, Y., 2010, Poverty Concentration and Determinants in 
China's Urban Low-income Neighbourhoods and Social Groups. International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 34, No. 2, 328–349. 
Hill, R. C., and Kim, J. W., 2000, Global cities and developmental states: New York, Tokyo 
and Seoul. Urban Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2167–2195. 
Hsing, Y., 2010, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Huang, Y., 2005, From work-unit compounds to gated communities: Housing inequality and 
residential segregation in transitional Beijing. In L. Ma and F. Wu, editors, 
Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Economy Society and Space. London: 
Routledge, 192–221. 
Igarashi T. and Ogawa, A., 2006, Kenchiku funsō (Construction conflicts). Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten. 
Iwabuchi, K., 2002, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese 
Transnationalism. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Jacobs, A.J, 2003, Embedded autonomy and uneven metropolitan development: A 
comparison of the Detroit and Nagoya auto regions, 1969–2000. Urban Studies, Vol. 
40, No. 2, 335–360. 
Jacobs, A.J., 2005, Has central Tokyo experienced uneven development? An examination of 
Tokyo‘s 23 ku relative to America‘s largest urban centers. Journal of Urban Affairs, 
Vol. 27, No. 5, 521–555. 
Jacobs, A. J., forthcoming, Expanding income stratification ‗yes‘, but converging ‗no‘: a 
comparison of Tokyo with America‘s largest city-regions. In A. J. Jacobs, editor, 
Major Cities of the World: Cases, Lessons, and a Toolkit for Studying Urban Regions. 
New York: Routledge. 
Legg, S., and McFarlane, C., 2008, Ordinary urban spaces: Between postcolonialism and 
development. Environment and Planning A, Vol. 40, No.1, 6–14.  
Logan, J., editor, 2008, Urban China in Transition. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Lützeler, R. 2008. Population increase and ‗new-build gentrification‘ in central Tokyo. 
Erdkunde Vol. 62, No. 4, 287–299.  
Ma, L., and Wu F., 2005, Restructuring the Chinese city: Diverse processes and reconstituted 
spaces. In L. Ma and F. Wu, editors, Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing 
Economy Society and Space. London: Routledge, 1–20. 
Ma, L., 2002, Urban transformation in China, 1949 - 2000: A review and research agenda. 
Environment & Planning A, Vol. 34, No. 9, 1545–1569.   
McCurry, J., 2007, Japan‘s age-old problem: with birth rates falling and life expectancy on 
the rise, Japan is now the world‘'s greyest society. Guardian 17 April. Accessed from: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/17/japan.justinmccurry?INTCMP=SRCH. 
sino-japanese, urban geography, waley.docx 
11 
 
McGee, T, 1991, The emergence of desakota regions in Asia: expanding a hypothesis. In N. 
Ginsburg, B. Koppel, and T. McGee, editors, The Extended Metropolis: Settlement 
Transition in Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
McFarlane, C., 2008, Urban shadows: Materiality, the ‗southern city‘ and urban theory. 
Geography Compass, Vol. 2, No. 2, 340–358. 
Nagata, T., and Kiyokawa, T., 2009, Ministry now grappling with startling poverty rate. The 
Asahi Shimbun, 2 December. Accessed from: 
  http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200912020130.html 
Pekkanen, R., 2006, Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Peng, I., Wong, J., and DeWit, A., 2010, East Asian welfare regimes. The Asia-Pacific 
Journal, 48-4-10, November. 
Pollard, J., McEwan, C., Laurie, N., and Stenning, A., 2009, Economic geography under 
postcolonial scrutiny. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 34, 
No. 2, 137–142. 
Read, B. I., and Chen, C. M., 2008, The state‘s evolving relationship with urban society: 
China‘s neighborhood organizations in comparative perspective. In J. Logan, editor, 
Urban China in Transition. Oxford: Blackwell, 315–335. 
Robinson, J., 2002, Global and world cities: A view from off the map. International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 26, No. 2, 531–554.  
Rogaski, R., 2000, Hygienic modernity in Tianjin. In J. Esherick, editor, Remaking the 
Chinese city: modernity and national identity, 1900-1950. Honolulu: Univeristy of 
Hawai‘i Press. 
Saitō, A., and Thornley, A., 2003, Shifts in Tokyo's world city status and the urban planning 
response. Urban Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 665–685. 
Sassen, S., 1991, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Scott, J., 1998, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Shi, M., 1998, From imperial gardens to public parks: The transformation of urban space in 
early twentieth-century Beijing. Modern China, Vol. 24, No. 3, 219–254. 
Slater, D., 2010, The Making of Japan‘s New Working Class: ―Freeters‖ and the Progression 
From Middle School to the Labor Market. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 1-1-10, January 
4th. 
Sorensen, A., Okata, J., and Fujii, S., 2010, Urban renaissance as intensification: building 
regulation and the rescaling of place governance in Tokyo‘s high-rise manshon boom. 
Urban Studies Vol. 47, No. 3, 556–583. 
Stanilov, K., 2007, Taking stock of post-socialist urban development: a recapitulation. In 
Stanilov, editor, The Post-Socialist City: Urban Form and Space Transformation in 
Central and Eastern Europe after Socialism. Dordrecht: Springer, 3–19.  
Stubbs, R., 2009, Whatever happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The unfolding 
debate. Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1–22. 
Taylor, P., 2000, World cities and territorial states under conditions of contemporary 
globalization. Political Geography, Vol. 19, No. 1, 5–32. 
Tilly, C., 1984, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation.  
Tsukamoto, T., 2011, Neoliberalization of the developmental state: Tokyo's bottom-up 
politics and state rescaling in Japan. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, first published on line, 25 May. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2427.2011.01057.x. 
sino-japanese, urban geography, waley.docx 
12 
 
Wade, R. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Waley, P., 2005, Parks and landmarks: Planning the Eastern Capital along western lines. 
Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1–16. 
Waley, P., 2007, Tokyo-as-world-city: Reassessing the role of capital and the state in urban 
restructuring. Urban Studies, Vol. 44, No. 8, 1465–1490. 
Wang, J., and Lau, S., 2009, Gentrification and Shanghai‘s new middle-class: Another 
reflection on the cultural consumption thesis. Cities, Vol. 26, No. 2, 57–116.  
Woo-Cumings, M., editor. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press.  
Wu F., 2010, Gated and packaged suburbia: Packaging and branding Chinese suburban 
residential development. Cities, Vol. 27, No. 5, 385–396. 
Wu, F., 2009, Globalization, the changing state, and local governance in Shanghai. In X. 
Chen, editor, Shanghai Rising: State Power and Local Transformations in a Global 
Megacity. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 125–144.  
Wu F., He S., and Webster C., 2010, Path dependency and the neighbourhood effect: Urban 
poverty in impoverished neighbourhoods in Chinese cities. Environment and Planning 
A, Vol. 42, No. 1, 134–152. 
Wu F., Webster, C., He, S., and Liu, Y., 2010, Urban Poverty in China. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar.  
Wu, F., and Webster, C., editors. 2010. Marginalization in Urban China: Comparative 
Perspectives. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan.  
Yeh, A. G. O., 2005, Dual land market and internal spatial structure of Chinese cities. In L. 
Ma and F. Wu, editors, Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Economy Society 
and Space. London: Routledge, 59–79.  
Yin, H., Shen, X., and Zhao, Z., 2005, Industrial restructuring and urban spatial 
transformation in Xi‘an. In L. Ma and F. Wu, editors, Restructuring the Chinese City: 
Changing Economy Society and Space. London: Routledge, 155–174.  
Xu, J., Yeh, A., and Wu, F., 2009. Land commodification: New land development and politics 
in China since the late 1990s. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
Vol. 33, No. 4, 890–913. 
 
